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DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast 
Trades Council: SUPREME COURT 
CLARIFIES THE PROVISO TO 
§8(6)(4) WHICH ALLOWS UNIONS 
TO CONDUCT INFORMATIONAL 
ACTIVITY. 
In DeBartolo Corp. fl. Fla. Gulf Coast 
Trades Council, __ U.S. _, 108 S. Ct. 
1392 (1988), the United States Supreme 
Court, on a petition for certiorari, ruled 
that peaceful handbilling, unaccompanied 
by picketing, urging a consumer boycott 
of a neutral employer was not coercive and 
therefore not a violation of § 8(bX4) of the 
National Labor Relations Act. 
The Florida Gulf Coast Building and 
Construction Trades Council (union) 
peacefully handbilled the customers of a 
shopping mall asking them not to shop at 
any of the mall's stores. The union's dis-
pute was with a construction company, for 
one of the mall's tenants, whom they alleg-
ed paid substandard wages and fringe bene-
fits to workers. The union hoped to 
influence the merchants, through a con-
sumer boycott, to put pressure on the con-
struction company. 
The owner of the mall, the Edward J. 
DeBartolo Corporation (DeBartolo), filed 
a petition with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) charging an unfair 
labor practice pursuant to § 8(b)( 4) of the 
National Labor Relatons Act (NLRA). 
The NLRB ruled that the union did not 
violate the act because handbilling was 
under the proviso for consumer publicity 
used to inform a distributor's customers 
that the manufacturer or producer of mer-
chandise was involved in a labor dispute. 
The ruling was affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. However, 
the Supreme Court of the United States 
reversed and remanded the case because 
the proviso to § 8(b)(4) did not cover the 
situation where the mall merchants do not 
distribute the construction company's pr~ 
ducts. The Court asked for a determina-
tion of whether the hand billing fell within 
the prohibition of § 8(b)(4), and, if so, 
whether it was protected by the first 
amendment. Id. at ----> 108 S. Ct. 1392. 
The NLRB reversed itself on remand 
and decided that there was a violation of § 
8(b)(4) because "handbilling and other 
activity urging a consumer boycott consti-
tuted coercion." Id. However, the Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had 
serious doubts about whether § 8(b)(4) 
could constitutionally ban peaceful hand-
billing not involving nonspeech elements 
and reversed the NLRB using the Supreme 
Court's reasoning in NLRB v. Catholic 
Bishop of Chicago, Id. Due to important 
labor and constitutional law issues, the 
Court granted certiorari and affirmed. 
Although the NLRB's interpretations of 
the NLRA are normally entitled to defer-
ence, under the "Catholic Bishop's Rule", 
where an otherwise acceptable construc-
tion of a statute would raise serious consti-
tutional problems, the Court will construe 
the statute to avoid such problems unless 
such construction is plainly contrary to 
the intent of Congress. Id. at -0 108 S. 
Ct. 1397. The NLRB's construction of the 
statute, as applied in this case, posed 
serious questions of the validity of § 8(b)( 4) 
under the First Amendment. Id. 
The handbilling was peaceful, truthfully 
told customers about an existing labor dis-
pute, and did not involve picketing. Simi-
lar acts by the union, such as generally 
discussing low wages via literature distrib-
uted in town or radio advertisements, 
would not violate the statute and would be 
protected by the First Amendment. Simi-
larly, handbills discussing a specific wage 
dispute should be equally protected. To 
hold otherwise "would require deciding 
serious constitutional issues." Id. at __ , 
108 S. Ct. at 1397-98. 
Next the Court reviewed whether Con-
gress intended to ban handbilling under § 
8(b)(4). The legislative history, however, 
clearly showed that a "union can hand out 
handbills at the shop, can place advertise-
ments in newspapers, can make announce-
ments over the radio, and can carry on all 
publicity short of ambulatory picketing in 
front of a secondary site." Id. at __ , 108 
S. Ct. at 1404. 
The decision in DeBartolo establishes 
that the proviso to § 8(b)(4) of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act is a clarification 
which allows unions to conduct informa-
tional activity short of picketing. Ii The 
proviso need not be treated as establishing 
an exception to an otherwise all encom-
passing NLRA prohibition on publicity. 
Rather it provides protection from com-
munication, such as picketing, which 
would be considered coercive. 
-Andrea White Steele 
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n: 
SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT A 
STATE MAY NOT CATEGORICAL-
LY PROHIBIT TARGETED, TRUTH-
FUL AND NONDECEPTIVE 
LAWYER ADVERTISING. 
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 
_U.S . ......, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988), the 
United States Supreme Court held that a 
state may not, consistent with the first and 
fourteenth amendments, categorically pr~ 
hibit lawyers from soliciting legal business 
for pecuniary gain by sending truthful and 
nondeceptive letters to potential clients 
known to face a particular legal problem. 
In 1985 Shapero, a member of the Ken-
tucky Bar, sought the Kentucky Attorneys 
Advertising Commission's approval of a 
letter that he proposed to send to potential 
clients who had pending foreclosure 
actions. In part the proposed letter stated 
that "you may be about to lose your 
home," that "[f]ederallaw may allow you 
to keep your home by ORDERING your 
creditor [sic] to STOP," that "[y]ou may 
call my office for FREE information," and 
that "[i]t may surprise you what I may be 
able to do for you." The Commission did 
not find the letter to be false or misleading 
but found it contrary to the existing Ken-
tucky Supreme Court rule which prohib-
its direct mailing to specific individuals as 
distinguished from mailing to the general 
public. 108 S. Ct. at 1919. The Commis-
sion, citing Zauderer v. Office of Dis· 
ciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), 
offered its view that the Kentucky rule vi~ 
lated the first amendment and recom-
mended that it be changed. 108 S. Ct. at 
1920. 
Shapero then sought an advisory opin-
ion as to the rule's validity from the Ken-
tucky Bar Association's Ethics 
Committee. The Committee indicated 
that the rule was consistent with the 
American Bar Association (ABA) Model 
Rule 7.3. After reviewing the Committee's 
opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court, 
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